Safety

Runway incursions after Haneda and Austin: what has changed

October 2, 202613 min readFor pilots

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In this article

Haneda: a clearance heard as something else
Austin: fog, no surface radar, and an assumption
JFK: a wrong turn during a busy taxi
2025–2026: Midway and LaGuardia
The numbers: what FAA data shows
What the FAA built after the 2023 summit
Cockpit alerting: the piece still missing
What it means for pilots

On the evening of January 2, 2024, a Japan Coast Guard Dash 8 sat on runway 34R at Tokyo Haneda for about 40 seconds before Japan Airlines 516, an A350, landed into it. Five of the six people on the Dash 8 died. All 379 people on the A350 got out. Eleven months earlier, a FedEx 767 on short final at Austin passed over a Southwest 737 that was rolling on the same runway in fog. The FedEx crew saw it from about 150 ft and went around.

Neither event was a freak. They, and a JFK incursion three weeks before Austin, came from layers that are familiar to anyone who flies the line: a clearance heard one way and meant another, a tower without surface radar, a busy flight deck during taxi. This article sets out what the investigators found, what the FAA and Japan have changed, and what is still pending as of October 2026.

Haneda: a clearance heard as something else

The Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) has not issued a final report. As of October 2026, its published products are an interim report (December 25, 2024), a second interim report (December 25, 2025), and an April 17, 2026 "Provision of Information" on cabin megaphones. Everything below is fact-finding, not a probable cause.

The facts in the first interim report:

The Dash 8 was carrying relief supplies to Niigata after the Noto Peninsula earthquake. JAL 516 was inbound from New Chitose.
At 17:45:14 the tower told the Dash 8 it was number one and to taxi to holding point C5. The crew read it back.
The captain understood the instruction as runway 34R, line up and wait, number one.
The Dash 8 crossed the holding position marking at 17:46:13, lined up at 17:46:46, and was struck at 17:47:27.
The tower controller was tracking the A350's approach and was not aware the Dash 8 had entered the runway.
Stop bar lights were not in operation at the time.
The A350 crew, both using head-up displays, had not recognized an aircraft on the runway before impact.

The second interim report describes night tests at Chubu Centrair with a Dash 8 parked on the runway under moonless conditions. The JTSB noted that every exterior light on the Dash 8 visible from behind was white, and the airplane sat among white centerline and touchdown zone lights. It tested red lights and an offset position, but its analysis is still under way. The board also flagged that Haneda's runway occupancy monitoring function had no established rules for how controllers should handle its alerts.

On the A350, the JTSB recorded that the evacuation command and PA systems did not work. Only three exits were usable: L1, R1 and L4. The evacuation began about 17:51:30 and was complete by about 17:58. One passenger was seriously hurt. The April 2026 notice found the portable megaphones barely audible after a relay of instructions down the cabin. The board asked authorities to consider countermeasures.

Japan has already acted. In a paper to the ICAO Assembly in July 2025, it listed more tower controllers at major airports, mandatory CRM training for all pilots, runway safety teams at major airports, and position transmitters for vehicles that enter runways. Within days of the crash, Japan's transport ministry also dropped "number one" from departure instructions, as reported by Airways Magazine.

Austin: fog, no surface radar, and an assumption

The NTSB adopted its Austin report on June 6, 2024. Visibility was 1/4 mile in freezing fog. The local controller could not see the approach end of the runway. He cleared Southwest 708 for takeoff with FedEx 1432 on final, assuming the 737 would be gone in time.

The NTSB's probable cause was that controller's incorrect assumption. Contributing factors included his expectation bias, his poor awareness of where the 737 was, and weak low-visibility training at the tower. Two more items sit in the probable cause:

The Southwest crew did a run-up of about 19 seconds on the runway and did not tell ATC they needed time.
The FAA had not required surface detection equipment or cockpit alerting at AUS.

Austin had no ASDE-X or similar surveillance. The controller told investigators that surface detection was the "one thing" that could have helped. The two airplanes came within 150 to 170 ft. Both cockpit voice recorders were overwritten because they held only two hours.

The Board's new recommendations to the FAA included surface detection at Part 139 airports that lack it (A-24-10). It also called for an AIM change so pilots tell ATC when they need time on the runway in low visibility (A-24-13), and for controllers to tell pilots when they cannot see them.

JFK: a wrong turn during a busy taxi

On January 13, 2023, American 106, a 777, crossed runway 4L at taxiway J without a clearance. Flight 1943 was rolling on 4L. The NTSB report, adopted May 29, 2024, found that American had been cleared to taxi toward 4L via taxiway B and to cross 31L at taxiway K. The crew instead crossed 4L at J.

The probable cause was the American crew's surface navigation error. That error came from distraction by concurrent tasks during taxi. The first officer and relief first officer were busy with a late load closeout and takeoff performance checks. The NTSB also cited the tower team's failure to catch the deviation and runway status lights that lit too late to stop the crossing. It named American's weak risk controls for taxi tasks as well.

The ASDE-X alert fired, and the local controller canceled Flight 1943's takeoff clearance. Its crew rejected the takeoff after reaching about 105 kt. The NTSB said the ASDE-X installation at JFK "likely prevented this incident from becoming an accident." New recommendations included a procedure for crews to say aloud the number of any runway they are about to cross (A-24-2). The Board also called for cockpit traffic alerting on new and existing transport airplanes (A-24-4 through A-24-6) and a review of status light timing (A-24-7 and A-24-8).

2025–2026: Midway and LaGuardia

The events kept coming. On February 25, 2025, a Flexjet Challenger at Chicago Midway was told to cross 31L and hold short of 31C. According to the NTSB preliminary report, as reported by AVweb, the crew took the 60-ft-wide 31L for a taxiway. They then took 31C for the runway they were cleared to cross. Southwest 2504 went around from just above the surface and passed about 200 ft behind the Challenger's tail. The sun was low and lined up with the landing runway.

On March 22, 2026, at 23:37, Air Canada Express 8646, a CRJ900, hit an airport rescue and firefighting truck on runway 4 at LaGuardia. Both pilots died and 39 people went to hospitals, according to the NTSB investigation page. The preliminary report came out in April 2026. As reported by Reuters via Insurance Journal and ABC News, it says:

The truck was cleared to cross with the jet about 130 ft above the ground.
The controller called "stop" twice, but the truck crew was not sure the call was for them.
ASDE-X gave no alert. The truck had no transponder.
The runway entrance lights stayed red until about three seconds before impact.

The investigation is ongoing. The NTSB has not found a cause.

The numbers: what FAA data shows

The FAA defines a runway incursion as the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a runway. Category A means a collision was narrowly avoided. Category B means separation shrank and there was a significant chance of collision.

Fiscal year	Total incursions	Category A + B
2021	1,574	18
2023	1,760	22
2024	1,758	9
2025 (period not specified)	more than 1,600	up 44% from 2024

FY2021–2024 figures come from the DOT Inspector General's March 2025 audit. In November 2023 testimony, the FAA counted 23 A and B events in FY2023. The 2025 figures come from an August 2026 FAA Safety Team notice, which does not say whether it uses the fiscal or calendar year.

Total counts stay roughly flat, while the serious events swing from year to year. The low count in FY2024 did not hold.

What the FAA built after the 2023 summit

After six serious incursions in early 2023, the FAA held a Safety Summit in March 2023 and issued SAFO 23002, "Aviation Safety Call to Action", on March 22. The SAFO told operators to review sterile flight deck rules, procedural discipline, CRM and runway safety guidance. The Air Traffic Organization committed to full supervisor attention at peak times, new training for unusual events and a fresh look at incursion data.

The bigger changes came in tower equipment:

System	What it does	Status as of October 2026
ASDE-X	Fuses radar, multilateration and ADS-B; alerts controllers to conflicts	35 airports
ASSC	ADS-B-based surface surveillance	9 airports
Runway Status Lights	Red in-pavement entrance and takeoff hold lights	20 airports
Surface Awareness Initiative (SAI)	ADS-B surface display for towers without surface radar	100 towers; target 220
Approach Runway Verification (ARV)	Alerts controllers when an arrival lines up on the wrong surface	More than 260 facilities
Runway Incursion Device (RID)	Controller memory aid for runway occupied or closed	More than 56 towers

Austin was among the first four SAI sites. The FAA said in September 2026 that it plans 44 more SAI sites by the end of 2026. The Inspector General found no plans to expand the legacy ASDE-X and RWSL systems because of budget limits. It also found that the FAA lacked an integrated way to analyze incursion data. The FAA agreed with all five of its recommendations.

Runway Safety Action Teams still meet each year at individual airports. The Inspector General noted that these teams focus on local fixes, not national trends, and that some stakeholders skip the meetings. The FAA's Runway Incursion Mitigation program reports an average 78% drop in incursions at airports where it put fixes in place.

Cockpit alerting: the piece still missing

Apart from runway status lights at 20 airports, every system in that table alerts the tower. At Austin and JFK, nothing warned the flight crews in time. That is why the NTSB issued A-24-4 through A-24-6. They ask the FAA to develop cockpit alerts for traffic on a runway, require them on new transport airplanes, and retrofit existing ones. The NTSB lists them as open.

An FAA rulemaking group's runway safety alerting subgroup reported in August 2024. It recommended faster certification of ADS-B-based collision alerting (SURF-A/SURF-IA), then a mandate on newly built Part 121 airplanes. It could not agree on a retrofit mandate and instead proposed that operators be encouraged to retrofit.

On the industry side:

Airbus described its SURF-A function in April 2024. It uses ADS-B traffic data to alert crews to a collision risk on takeoff and to call for a go-around on approach.
Honeywell's SURF-A is a software update to its TCAS and runway safety products. It aims to warn of a conflict within the next 30 seconds. Honeywell lists it as pending FAA certification, with availability expected in 2027.
Honeywell says Aeroméxico has selected SURF-A for more than 100 aircraft.

As of October 2026, no US rule requires cockpit runway traffic alerting. Because SURF-A works from ADS-B data, traffic that does not broadcast, such as a vehicle without a transponder, would not be seen by it.

What it means for pilots

The defenses on the ground are growing, but at most airports the last one is still the crew. Practical points, each tied to guidance:

Treat taxi as a critical phase. AC 120-74B calls for a sterile cockpit during taxi. It puts high-workload tasks before the airplane moves. GAPPRI (recommendation AO11) applies sterile flight deck rules to all surface movement. JFK showed what happens when two of three pilots are heads-down on late load numbers. If the closeout arrives late, stop the airplane to deal with it.

Read back hold short and line up and wait in full. AIM 4-3-18 asks for readback of the runway assignment, any clearance to enter a runway, and any hold short instruction. AC 120-74B says to use the full call sign and avoid "roger" or "wilco." A correct readback is not proof of correct understanding. At Haneda the readback was right, and the crew still entered the runway.

Say the runway number out loud. The NTSB's JFK finding was that saying the runway number aloud before crossing would cut incursions. AC 120-74B already suggests calling out each hold short line by runway number as you approach it. Brief the expected crossings, then call each one as you reach it.

Respect line up and wait. AIM 5-2-5 says LUAW is not a takeoff clearance. If no takeoff clearance comes within a reasonable time, call ATC. Be especially alert at night, in low visibility and with intersecting runways. Scan the full length of the runway and the final approach before and while you taxi on. Remember that the tower may not see you. At Haneda, a stationary airplane on the runway went unseen for about 40 seconds. NASA's CALLBACK 550 includes a LUAW report in which only the captain's caution kept a crew from taking off with traffic still on the runway.

Verify the runway before takeoff and landing. AC 120-74B lists runway identification, compass heading, FMC entry and the ATC clearance as pre-takeoff checks. Midway's Challenger crew took a narrow runway for a taxiway. Use signs, markings, heading and the moving map together. If anything doesn't match, stop and ask. GAPPRI AO12 says to stop the aircraft and contact ATC when position is in doubt.

Make yourself visible. AIM 4-3-24 calls for all exterior lights when taxiing on or across any runway. It calls for all lights except landing lights when entering the runway for takeoff or LUAW. GAPPRI AO26 asks for the best use of lights to aid detection at night. The JTSB's point about the Dash 8's white lights against white centerline lights shows why.

Never cross a red bar. GAPPRI AO22 says crews shall not cross illuminated red stop bars, even with a clearance, and should challenge the clearance instead. Red runway status lights mean the runway is unsafe to enter or take off on. The FAA also says the lights do not replace an ATC clearance, so lights going out are not permission to go.

Speak up about runway time. Following the Austin report, tell ATC if you need time on the runway for a run-up in low visibility. If you are slow to roll, say so.

Night and low visibility raise the stakes. Austin, JFK, Haneda and LaGuardia all happened at night or in fog. On final, listen to the clearances given to others and keep looking at the whole runway. If anything looks wrong, go around.

Sources

This is general information, not operating guidance. Your company's procedures, your aircraft's manuals and the regulations come first.